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INTRODUCTION
This case is one in which the trial court made numerous
material errors requiring, at a minimum, significant corrections to
the judgment, or more properly, a reversal with a remand for a new
trial. The trial court used an improper measure of damages relying
on a "loss of subsequent sale" rather than the proper "difference
in fair market value before and after the negligent act," failed to
follow the evidence on "loss of sale" theory, improperly awarded
pre-judgment interest, improperly awarded numerous costs including
1

costs rejected in its own minute entry decision, improperly entered
the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law before the
time for objections had run, and rejected without hearing all
objections timely filed by Calder.

Assuming Calder was negligent

in signing the Certificate of Survey, the trial court's decision
should be reversed on the numerous grounds set forth in Appellant's
Brief.
In many respects, this case is the Price-Orem Investment Co.
v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989)
case

revisited

with

the

precedent of this Court.

trial

court

ruling

contrary

to

the

These errors, which are analyzed in more

detail in Appellant's Brief and below, revolve mainly around the
two significant damage issues in this case, the improper measure of
damages and pre-judgment interest.

Calder submits that this Court

follow its rulings in Price-Orem

and reject the trial court's

improper measure of damages and granting of pre-judgment interest.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CLAIM OF APPELLEES, BASED UPON A THEORY OF
NEGLIGENCE, IS BARRED BY REASON OF THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS SINCE APPELLEES DISCOVERED, OR SHOULD HAVE
DISCOVERED, THAT A PROBLEM IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THEIR RECEIPT OF DEEDS IN 1980.
The claim against Calder is based in negligence.

Under the

prevailing statutes and case law, a action based in negligence must
be brought within four

(4) years of discovery or otherwise be

2

barred by the statute of limitations.1

The evidence clearly

indicates the Appellees knew of the error in 1980, at the latest,
thus actuating the statute of limitations.

The trial court,

however, errored in not ruling this action being time barred
against Calder.
Appellees argue, and Calder acknowledges, that the "discovery
rule" is applicable in negligence cases such as this case.

This

proposition was set forth in the previous appeal from this same
case when the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations would
begin to run when the party "learns of or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts which give
rise to the cause of action." Klinqer v. Kiqhtly, 791 P.2d 868
(Utah 1990).
Therefore, it is imperative to determine in this case when
Appellees knew or should have known of the facts which give rise to
the cause of action.

However, the trial court made no ruling in

its Minute Entry decision regarding when this occurred.
Findings of Fact are also silent on this issue.

The

Calder requested

a hearing to better understand the ruling of the court and clarify
this issue, among others, but the trial court summarily denied the
request for hearing.
As such, and with no other basis to start from, an analysis of
the facts must be taken in order to find the "rational" time at
which the Appellees knew or should have known the facts necessary
to bring this negligence action. This analysis will show that the
1

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-12-25(2).
3

Appellees not only should have known, but in fact knew of the error
in the legal description surrounding the subject property.2
The facts in this case are described in more detail in
Appellant's Brief, but a short summary is provided here.

The

Appellees first contact with a description of the subject property
was through a plat map.3

The Appellees then purchased the lot

through a Uniform Real Estate Contract in 1971 with a legal
description using the metes and bounds method.4

After being

contacted by the Strawberry River Estates, Inc. later in the same
year regarding additional property, it was agreed that Strawberry
River Estates would include the additional property with the
original purchase of the Appellees.5

As such, a new Uniform Real

Estate Contract using metes and bounds to describe the property was
prepared in October of 1971, but was back dated to the original
June 2, 1971, purchase date.6
When the Appellees paid off the contract amount, they received
a Warranty
However,

it

Deed
is

for

this

undisputed

property
that

the

dated
legal

October
metes

24, 1980.7
and

bounds

description on the Warranty Deed differed from the description
found in the Uniform Real Estate Contract used to purchase the
2

Kightly R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428.

3

Kightly R. 373, 420.

4

Ex. P-6.

Kightly R. 406.

5

Ex. P-4.

Kightly R. 371 - 374.

6

Ex. P-6.

Kightly R. 376 - 378.

7

Ex. P-8.

Kreis R. 467, 471 - 472.

4

Kreis R. 468 - 469.

property.8

Mr. Kightly, one on the Appellees, testified that he

reviewed the deed and noticed this discrepancy.9 He also testified
that he received and reviewed two quitclaim deeds at about the same
time and those legal descriptions were also inconsistent.10

Mr.

Kightly testified that he knew there was a mistake, but "thought it
might be just a typographical error."11

However, Mr. Kightly

testified he did nothing to determine why the legal description had
been changed.12
This Court has stated that "mere ignorance of the existence of
a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statue of
limitations."13

In S e w v. Security Title Co. , 218 Adv. Rep. 34

(Utah 1993), this Court stated that the discovery rule may be
applied if there exists "exceptional or unique circumstances".
This Court went on to state that there is a threshold requirement
that the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff did not know and
could not have known that a cause of action existed so as to file
an action within the limitation period.

See Warren v. Provo City

Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992).

8

Compare Ex. P-6 and Ex. P-8.

9

R. 387; 412 - 413; 427.

Kightly R. 412 - 413, 427 -

428.

10

Exs. D-l and D-2.

11

R. 414.

12

R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428.

R. 413 - 414; R 427.

13

S e w v. Security Title Co., 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah
1993), citing Mvers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
5

In the case at hand, the trial court made no finding of the
existence of such "exceptional or unique circumstances." Likewise,
the trial court did not find that the Appellees met the threshold
requirement as set forth in Sew. 14

In fact, as demonstrated

above, the evidence is to the contrary.

Appellees have not

disputed, but have in fact confirmed that there was an error in the
legal description and the Appellees failed to investigate the
errors.
The

uncontroverted

evidence

shows

that

the

facts

were

available and easily ascertainable in 1980 and the Appellees knew
of the errors when they received the warranty and two quitclaim
deeds

with

contract.15

differing

legal

descriptions

from

the

purchase

The Appellees also testified that they did nothing to

investigate why there was an error.16

The evidence clearly

supports a finding that the four year limitation period began to
run, at the latest in 1980.
By not investigating, the Appellees allowed 14 years to pass
before bringing this action.

There is no question that not only

have memories faded, but John Stafford, the survey party chief and
the principal party involved with the survey certificate, passed
away and was therefore unavailable to testify.17
14

S e w , 218 U.A.R. at 36.

15

Compare Ex. P-6, P-8, D-l, and D-2.

16

Kightly R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428.

17

It is clear that

The trial court also refused to admit the survey diary of
Mr. Stafford which was made contemporaneously with the disputed
events. See Point III relating to the admissibility of the survey

6

the passage of time has prejudiced Calder in his defense of this
case due to the fact that memories have faded, responsible parties
have disappeared, and key witnesses have passed away.
Therefore, as of 1980, Appellees knew of the error, but did
nothing to investigate. The four year statute of limitations began
to run from this time. See Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah
1990).

Appellees did not bring this action until 1986 - more than

four years later.

The trial court, in the face of Appellees' own

testimony, errored by not dismissing this action against Calder as
being time barred.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT USED AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN
CALCULATING THE AMOUNT TO AWARD TO APPELLEES.
Under the theory of negligence, there must be a logical causal
connection between the negligent act of the defendant and the
damages claimed by the plaintiff. That is, there must be found to
be some proximate cause.

In the case at hand, there is no such

causal connection between the negligence, if any, of Calder and the
damages claimed by Appellees. Further, the measure of damages used
by the trial court was inappropriate.
a)

Calder did not participate in the preparation of
the documents used to transfer title to the
Appellees.

Appellees acknowledge that Calder did not participate in the
preparation of

the documents used

to transfer title to the

diary as a business record pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence
803(6).
7

Appellees.

Appellees argue that this fact is irrelevant because

the damages awarded Appellees in this suit "were not for the
original property loss."18 However, assuming Calder was negligent,
this would have been the proper measure of damages.
Further, Appellees admit that had they known of the error,
"they would not have been likely to enter into a sale of land which
they did not own."19

Appellees claim damages against Calder

damages for the "loss of the benefit of the bargain" for a sale of
property, the most valuable of which Appellees never owned. Calder
had no control or involvement in what property Appellees did or did
not receive.
The

contract

which

was

prepared

and

created

ownership

interests was done ten months before Calder's alleged negligent
act.20

Calder

property.21

had

no

Therefore,

part

in

Calder?s

the

legal

negligence

transfer
in

of

the

signing

the

certificate, if any, in no way altered what property the Appellees
had already received from the Strawberry River Estates.

b)

Appellees did not use the legal description
contained in the survey certificate in their
attempted transfer of the property to the Klingers.

Appellees do not dispute the fact that legal description
contained in the survey certificate was not used in the documents
18

Appellees Brief,

19

Appellees Brief, pg. 17.

20

Ex. P-l; Kightly R. 407.

21

Calder R. 487, 503.

pg. 16.

Ostler R. 536 - 537, 540.

8

when attempting to transfer title to the property.

Appellees

rather focus on other benefits which one may gain from having a
survey performed.

While there may be other benefits from having

the map, the fact remains that Appellees did not use or rely upon
the legal description contained in the survey certificate.
Appellees concede they never owned part of the property which
they attempted to convey and that they did not use the legal
description contained in Calder's certificate. Instead, Appellees
used the description contained in their warranty deed received in
1980 from Security Title.22

There was no reliance on the accuracy

of the certificate, only reliance on the accuracy of the warranty
deed.
The trial court erroneously found that Calder, by signing a
certificate

containing

the

legal

description

contained

in

Appellees' purchase contract, was liable for Appellees' loss of the
benefit of the subsequent sale where the Appellees used a different
legal description.

Therefore, no causal connection existed.

The

negligence, if any, on the part of Calder was superseded and cut
off by the negligence of the party who prepared the warranty deed
containing

a

different

legal

description,

the

same

legal

description which ultimately used to transfer the property to the
Klingers.

Compare P-6, P-7, and P-8.
9

Rightly R. 390.

c)

The damages claimed by Appellees against Calder
were not the appropriate measure of damages.

In awarding damages in this tort action, it was improper for
the trial court to use the amount of a lost sale which took place
more than ten years after the alleged tort and injury.
This Court held in Price-Orem, another negligent surveying
case very similar to this case, that:
the measure of damages for permanent injury to real
property is the difference between the market value of
the property
immediately before and immediately after the
injury,23 (emphasis added)
This Court went on to state that:
[b]ecause liability attached at the time of the loss [the
appraisal made near that time] is more relevant to the
actual loss incurred under this measure of damages than
the subsequent historical data, (Id.) (See also Ault v.
Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987).
The Appellees purchased the property in 1971 for $5,500.24
The negligent act, if any, by Calder occurred in 1972. Therefore,
the damages would be the difference in value of the property right
before the act and the value of the property right after the
negligent act in 1972.
The trial court, however, inappropriately considered the value
of the land which significantly increased to approximately $32,000
in 1983 due to oil crises.25

This subsequent historical data is

not the appropriate basis to measure damages.

Appellees did not

23

Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown, and Gunnel,
Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989).
24

Ex. P-6.

25

Rightly R. 401 - 402. Wilkerson R. 436.
10

present any evidence at trial as to property value in 1972, the
time the tort and injury occurred.
By its award of damages, the trial court has inappropriately
allowed the Appellees to recoup from Calder the profit they would
have received in a sale of the property more than 10 years after
the tort, and property which the Appellees never owned.

This

ruling is contrary to applicable case law and must be reversed.

d)

The trial courtf s finding
supported by the evidence.

of

damages

is

not

Even though the measure of damages awarded by the trial court
was improper as discussed immediately above, the trial court
compounded its error by using figures that do not reflect the
evidence presented.

Even though this point is now moot, a brief

recount will be provided.
In Appellees1

Brief, the Appellee

cites

to

the record

concerning the testimony regarding the value of the property.

In

referring to the testimony cited, the only valuations given are
from the testimony of the Appellees' expert witness. He testified
that the Appellees had received an offer to purchase the land for
$10,000, but the Appellees, contrary to Appellees' expert's advice,
turned the offer down.26 When asked what the present value of the
property was, Appellees' expert testified that it was worth $8,000,
not $6,000 as stated on Ex. P-9.27

26

R. 445, 450.

27

R. 448.
11

This exhibit was also only

admitted for only illustrative purposes.

In closing arguments,

Appellees1 counsel in recounting the evidence presented that the
present value of the property was $8,000.28
Appellees contend that because there is conflicting testimony
about the present value of the property being either $10,000 or
$8,000, it is nevertheless reasonable for the trial court to have
concluded that the present value of the property was $6,000. Such
is not the case. There is no rational basis whatsoever to support
the accounting as set forth in Exhibit P-9. The trial court had no
legal or factual basis to rule according and such a finding is
contradictory to the evidence presented at trial.
received an offer for $10,000.

Appellees

This appears to be the most

conclusive evidence of present market value.

This measure of

damages is not only inapplicable to this case, but the trial
court's award of damages does not properly reflect the evidence
presented.
e)

Conclusion

Accordingly, there is no logical causal connection between the
damages claimed by Appellees and any negligence on the part of
Calder.

Appellees were not damaged by Calder?s negligence in

signing the plat certificate.

The Appellees were damaged, if at

all, due to the negligence of the person who prepared the documents
which contained

a legal description different than what the

Appellees intended and believed they were purchasing. Furthermore,
even if Calder were liable, the evidence presented does not support
28

Closing Arg. pg. 10.
12

the amount of damages awarded

to Appellees.

The trial court

clearly applied an incorrect measure of damages when it improperly
adopted the "loss of subsequent sale" analysis rather than the
appropriate measure being the difference in the fair market value
before and after the negligent act of Calder.

As such, this award

must be reversed.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE THE
BUSINESS DIARY KEPT BY JOHN STAFFORD, THE CHIEF OF THE
SURVEY PARTY, WHO HAD DIED BEFORE TRIAL.
The survey diary of John Stafford was offered as evidence at
trial as a business record.

Calder in its initial brief set forth

the standard for determining when a record should be admitted into
evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
Appellees appear to concede that the requirements were met and the
diary was admissible.

Appellees, however, now contend that the

diary could have been deemed inadmissable as being irrelevant.29
Such

a

contention

is

not

supported

by

the

record

and

the

as

the

circumstances surrounding the diary.
This

diary,

which

was

recorded

contemporaneously

disputed events occurred, would have been evidence to contradict
testimony of Appellees including the fact that Stafford was in fact
hired, not by the Appellees, but by Strawberry River Estates to
perform the survey work.

The diary would have contradicted the

testimony of Appellees that Stafford was requested to survey lots
29

Appellees Brief, pg. 23.

13

30 and 31 and not the metes and bounds description from the Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

The diary also clarifies the fact that

Calder did not have an office in Duchesne as asserted by the
Appellees.
This evidence is relevant not only as to the credibility of
the witnesses, but to clarify who hired whom to do what, when the
survey was performed, the location of the survey, etc.

This

evidence would clearly refute Finding of Fact No. 8 and casts great
doubt on Finding of Fact Nos. 9 and 16.30

This evidence is

extremely relevant to the overall understanding of this case and
the relationship between the parties.

Furthermore, there was no

objection or ruling as to the relevance of the diary, only that the
diary was hearsay and did not meet the requirements for the
business rule exception.31
The trial court's ruling to deny the admittance of this diary
should be overturned where the court has abused its discretion.
State ex rel. Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977).

The proper

foundation for the admission of the diary was laid as provided by
Rule 803(6).

See also, Hansen v. Heath, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 16

(Utah 1993).
The

trial

court

incorrectly

ruled

that

this

diary was

inadmissible as being hearsay when it should have admitted the
diary into evidence under the business record exception to the
hearsay rule.

Furthermore, the diary is clearly relevant to the

30

See Finding of Facts.

31

Court R. 508 - 511, 532 - 533.
14

action. As such, in this case, the trial court clearly abused its
discretion.

As set forth above and in Appellant's Brief, an

adequate foundation was laid as required by Rule 803(6) and the
trial courtf s refusal to admit the diary into evidence was clearly
erroneous.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
The trial court's awarding of pre-judgment interest to the
Appellees is clearly erroneous and contrary to case law.

The

Appellees contend that Calder's reliance on Price-Orem Inv. Co. v.
Rollins, Brown, & Gunnel1, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989), a ruling
from this Court, is misplaced.

Appellees argue that Price-Orem is

a breach of contract action with the awarding of "liquidated
damages" and not a tort action as is the case at hand.

This

assertion is completely contrary to the facts and holding of that
case.
In Price-Orem, this Court determined that the prevailing party
was not entitled to prejudgment interest. Price-Orem was an action
for negligent surveying, not breach of contract as asserted by
Appellees.

There is also no mention of liquidated damages.

That

case is not distinguishable as Appellees contend, but is very much
on point and controlling precedent.
In Price-Orem, the plaintiff sought, as in the case at hand,
damages against the surveyor for loss of value to the property due

15

to the negligent survey.

This Court cited precedent law from the

Utah Supreme Court and stated in part:
[W]here damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated
with mathematical accuracy . . . the amount of damage
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact
at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is
not allowed, (emphasis added) (citing Biork v. April
Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)).
This Court further stated that the damages must be ascertained "in
accordance with fixed rules of evidence . . . rather than be guided
by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed . . ."
(Price-Orem citing Fell v. Union Pac. Rv. Co., 88 P. 1003, 1007
(Utah 1907)).
In analyzing the facts of that case and the method used in
determining the damages, this Court found that when the trial court
uses "fair market values" of real property to ascertain damages,
the damages "cannot be determined with mathematical precision, and
may be inherently uncertain . . . "

This Court went on to indicate

that even though there is a sufficient basis to uphold the award of
damages when the damages are not determinable with mathematical
precision, "it is far too uncertain to support a prejudgment
interest award." Price-Orem at 482-83.
The trial court in this case determined that Calder was
negligent in his signing of the survey certificate.32

The court

found no breach of contract. The trial court awarded Appellees the
"Loss on Sale" and calculated the damages by taking the sales

Minute Entry R. 291. Conclusions of Law R. 302.
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price, less present value of the property.3

The trial court's

use of the present market value is, at best, an estimation.

This

method of damage calculation is inherently uncertain and without
mathematical precision.

As pre-judgment interest was found to be

improper in Price-Orem. it is likewise improper in this case and
must be reversed.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED COSTS IN THIS CASE
INCLUDING THE FILING FEES OF THE PRIOR APPEAL, THE
WITNESS FEES IN THE FIRST TRIAL IN WHICH CALDER WAS NOT
A PARTY, THE WITNESS FEES FOR EXPERTS OF APPELLEE, THE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE FIRST TRIAL, PRINTING COSTS OF THE
BRIEFS IN THE FIRST APPEAL, PHOTOCOPIES, ETC.
While, as both parties have pointed out, the trial court does
have some discretion in awarding costs in an action, there are
clear parameters within which the trial court must remain.
case

at

hand,

however,

the

trial

court

clearly

In the

abused

its

there

are

discretion in its awarding of costs.
As

set

forth

at

length

in Appellant's

parameters which are provided

Brief,

to the courts when it comes to

awarding costs. Appellees in their brief object to Calder's demand
for a "full accounting for every penny awarded."

Calder requested,

but was not afforded by the trial court, the opportunity to object
and

gain

an

understanding

of

the

costs

claiming in their Memorandum of Costs.

which

Appellees

were

This alone is grounds for

remanding this issue to the trial court for further determination.

Minute Entry R. 291.

Ex. P-9.
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However, many of the costs on their face are inappropriate,
contrary to law, and/or completely contrary to the Minute Entry
ruling of the trial court.
Calder has described in great detail the errors and abuse of
discretion which was committed by the trial court in the awarding
of costs as they relate to witness, clerk, constable, and reporter
fees along with the "miscellaneous costs" claimed by the Appellees.
Furthermore, Appellees have not disputed any of the assertions set
forth in Appellant's Brief.
Although a trail court may have discretion in regard to the
allowance of certain costs, in this case, the trial court clearly
abused its discretion by awarding costs contrary to its own Minute
Entry ruling, contrary to law, and costs from other actions.34 As
such, the award of these costs must be reversed, or at a minimum,
remanded to the trial court for further determination as to the
appropriateness of the costs.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CALDERfS OBJECTIONS TO
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DOING SO
WITHOUT EVEN A HEARING ON THE OBJECTIONS, PARTICULARLY
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT HAD ISSUED ONLY A VERY BRIEF
CONCLUSORY MINUTE ENTRY, WITHOUT ANY FINDINGS OF FACT, ON
ITS DECISION OF THE CASE.
Appellees in their brief do not dispute any of the facts set
forth in Appellant's Brief. They only contend that such a hearing
is discretionary on the part of the trial court judge. However, as

R.

291.
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was set forth in Appellant's Brief, the facts in this case are a
clear example of a trial court's abuse of discretion.
The trial court issued a brief minute order regarding its
ruling in the case.35

However, the proposed Finding of Facts and

Conclusions of Law which were prepared by the Appellees did not
conform to the memorandum decision and also contradicted evidence
presented

at

trial.

These

proposed

Findings

of

Facts and

Conclusions of Law were then adopted by the trial court without
modification.36
The trial court, at the same time, signed the Judgment
prepared by Appellees, including prejudgment interest.37 The trial
court signed these documents even before the time had expired for
Calder to object or comment on the proposed findings.
Nevertheless, Calder timely filed his responses to these
documents specifically objecting to certain findings, included
costs and prejudgment interest.38

Calder also requested a hearing

for argument as to the Findings of Fact, Judgment and Memorandum of
Costs.39 Appellees did not contest Calder's objections to the cost
or the judgment in their reply.40

R. 291.
R. 296 - 303.
R. 304 - 306.
R. 307 - 310.
R. 311 - 312.
R. 313 - 318.
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Despite Appellees apparent acceptance of certain objections by
Calder, the trial court issued a minute entry order summarily
denying

Calderfs

request

for a hearing,

concluding

findings and judgment reflect the courts decision.41

that the

This action

by the trial court was a clear abuse of discretion and contrary to
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and the
relevant case law as set forth in Appellant's Brief.

Calderfs

request for hearing should have been granted.

CONCLUSION

Appellees claim against Calder for negligence is governed by
the applicable four-year statute of limitations and the "discovery
rule".

Appellees knew that a problem existed in 1980 when they

received deeds transferring title, but did nothing to investigate.
The trial court errored in not finding that the action was time
barred in the face of this undisputed evidence. This ruling should
be reversed, and the action against Calder be dismissed.
Further, assuming Calder was negligent, there remains the fact
that there is no proper or logical causal connection between any
negligence

of

Calder

and

the

damages

claimed

by Appellees.

Furthermore, the evidence does not support the amount of damages
awarded.

Damages were awarded based on a "loss of sale" measure

rather than the appropriate measure of damages comparing the fair
market value both immediately before and immediately after the
41

R. 319.
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injury. As such, if damages are awarded, they must, at a minimum,
be reduced to reflect the proper measure of damages.
The trial court improperly excluded from evidence the business
diary kept by John Stafford, one of the surveyors, who had died in
Alaska a few months before trial. The diary meets the requirements
as set forth in the Rules of Evidence as a business record.

The

diary is relevant in this case in that it provides evidence which
irrefutably contradicts specific Findings of Facts, clarifies the
relationship of the parties, and sheds light as to the credibility
of witnesses.

This Court must remand this case to trial with the

direction to admit this diary into evidence.
The trial court also improperly awarded pre-judgment interest
in this case.

Price-Orem provides controlling law that pre-

judgment interest can only be awarded when the damages can be
calculated with mathematical certainty.

The award in this case

against Calder was based in negligence, and calculated using
estimated

property

market

value.

Such

an

analysis

sufficiently certain to justify pre-judgment interest.

is not
As such,

this Court must reverse the trial courts awarding of pre-judgment
interest.
The trial court improperly assessed costs in this case. The
trial court erroneously awarded costs contrary to its own Minute
Entry decision, contrary to law, and costs from other actions.
This Court must reverse the trial court's awarding of costs, or at
a minimum, remand for further determination.
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The trial court improperly denied Calder's objections to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial court did so

without even granting a hearing on the objections. The action must
be remanded for hearing on Calder's objections.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//

day of February, 1994.
WALSTADfitBABCOCK

By:

VJU^^ITMlQfl

Robert F/ Babcock
Brian J. Babcock
Attorneys for Appellant
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